Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions

404 Seiten, Taschenbuch

Kurzbeschreibung des Verlags

I Iterated Knowledge and Common Knowledge.- 1 On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge.- 2 A Complete Epistemic Logic for Multiple Agents.- 3 Axiomatic Indefinability of Common Knowledge in Finitary Logics.- 4 Eliminating Redundancies in Partition Spaces.- II The Logical Omniscience Problem.- 5 From Logical Omniscience to Partial Logical Competence.- 6 Knowledge and Belief Representation in a Partial Model.- 7 Awareness and Partitional Informational Structures.- 8 Representing the Knowledge of Turing Machines.- III Applications to Game Theory and Decision Theory.- 9 Logics for Nonomniscient Agents: An Axiomatic Approach.- 10 Alternative Definitions of Knowledge.- 11 Synchronic Information, Knowledge and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games.- 12 Analyzing Games by Sequences of Metatheories.- 13 Rationally Justifiable Play and the Theory of Noncooperative Games.- 14 The Epistemic Structure of a Theory of a Game.- 15 On the Evaluation of Solution Concepts.

• Reihe: Theory and Decision Library C
• Themen: Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Finanzen, Betriebswirtschaft und Management Wirtschaftswissenschaft Wirtschaftstheorie und -philosophie
• ISBN: 9781461284369
• Sprache: Englisch
• Erscheinungsdatum: 17.09.2011
• Größe: 240 x 160 mm
• Verlag: Springer
• Herausgegeben von: Philippe Mongin, H. S. Shin, M. Bacharach, Louis André Gerard-Varet