Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

von Demet Çetiner

168 Seiten, Taschenbuch

Kurzbeschreibung des Verlags

A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.

• Reihe: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
• Themen: Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Finanzen, Betriebswirtschaft und Management Betriebswirtschaft und Management Unternehmensforschung
• ISBN: 9783642358210
• Sprache: Englisch
• Erscheinungsdatum: 13.04.2013
• Größe: 23.5 x 15.5 cm
• Verlag: Springer Berlin